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8. Cosmologies of Fear: The Medicalization of Anxiety in Contemporary Britain 
Rebecca Lynch 
 
Rates of anxiety within the UK have been found to be on the increase, with the UK 
government’s Adult Psychiatric Morbidity Survey revealing that 9% of individuals 
experience mixed depression and anxiety and 4.4% generalized anxiety disorder 
(NHS IC, 2009).  Increasingly these levels of anxiety have been attributed to living in 
more anxious times, other authors having investigated what has made the times we 
live in more anxious and why we should respond to these in the way in which we do 
(Furedi, 2007; Wilkinson, 2001). These approaches view anxiety as a social 
‘problem’ in opposition to the wealth of medical and psychological literature on the 
subject that views anxiety as an individual defect. The understanding of anxiety may 
be further developed however by taking an approach that links the social with the 
individual, relating this also to the to the medicalization of the experience of anxiety- 
through looking at anxiety, and the medicalization of anxiety, cosmologically. Within 
this approach, anxiety is viewed as a specific cultural response that relates to, and 
expresses, Euro-American cosmological ideas about the self and its existential 
relationship to the cosmos. This is influenced strongly by social and historical 
developments within Euro-American society, and subsequently results in the 
medicalization of anxiety as a cultural response to the experience. Such an approach 
attempts to further the understanding of anxiety as a Euro-American experience, but 
furthermore, in placing anxiety in its cultural and historical context, may also 
contribute to our understanding of notions of cosmology and individual response 
within Britain and other Euro-American societies.   
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Research undertaken for the Mental Health Foundation suggests that as a 
nation, the UK is becoming more fearful; individuals perceive the world to be more 
frightening, and in turn feel more frightened (Mental Health Foundation 2009:3). This 
survey found that 37% of adults believed they get anxious or frightened more 
frequently than they used to, 77% believed people in general are more anxious or 
frightened than they used to be and 77% believed that in the last 10 years the world 
has become a more frightening place (Mental Health Foundation 2009:5). The survey 
reported that those interviewed were most anxious about the current financial 
situation (recession) (66%), money/finances/debt (49%), death of loved ones (45%), 
crime/the threat of crime (35%), the welfare of their children (34%), developing a 
serious illness or disease (33%), getting old (27%), the state of the environment (18%) 
and the threat of war (14%) (Mental Health Foundation 2009:21). Such concerns 
reflect the social environment and period of time in which the survey was conducted 
and reveal the how fears may be embedded within a social context. A cycle of fear 
and risk aversion was also found by this survey, with perceived fear leading to risk 
aversion leading to actual fear (Mental Health Foundation 2009:33). This report 
therefore links the increase in fear within the UK to increased numbers of individuals 
with clinical anxiety; if fear levels in the general public are high then more people 
will experience mental illness, and particularly the most common mental illnesses; 
depression, anxiety and anxiety disorders (Mental Health Foundation 2009:1).  
If levels of fear are related to levels of medical anxiety in the UK, medical 
anxiety would appear to reflect social and cultural aspects of living in the UK today. 
Furthermore, the examination of anxiety and its medicalization within the UK 
provides an example of how social experience and social distress may be taken on and 
experienced within the individual as personal distress, and how this is then dealt with 
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culturally through medicalization of this individual experience. Such investigation 
into the cultural experience of anxiety also begs the question of explanations for the 
levels of anxiety and fear within the UK. This is particularly interesting as levels of 
anxiety have risen despite the fact that individuals live in statistically safer times than 
previous generations, for example the fear of crime is still rising despite the fact that 
levels of crime have decreased in the last decade (Mental Health Foundation 2009:3). 
What are we then talking about when we speak about fear and anxiety in the UK? 
How might these experiences be situated within the British context? 
 
 
The Nature of Anxiety 
 
Anxiety, as we know, is part of everyday experience. However anxiety is also viewed 
as a clinical problem; the experience of anxiety is culturally transformed into 
symptoms when a particular point on the anxiety continuum is reached. The point at 
which clinical anxiety is sectioned off from “normal” anxiety is difficult to define but 
for some authors, this is where anxiety is obstructive in day-to-day life and where 
clinical intervention would be beneficial (Gale and Davidson 2007). A range of 
explanations and approaches have attempted to understand (and treat) anxiety of a 
clinical level. The evolutionist idea that anxiety results from a ‘fight or flight’ 
response has been picked up by some psychologists such as Michelle Craske who, 
like other psychologists, views anxiety as due to maladaptive thinking, resulting from 
inappropriate upbringing and socialization. She notes that individuals with 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) for example continually detect and interpret 
possible threats, over-estimating the probability of the threats and seeing themselves 
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as ineffective at managing these. A cycle is then created, a negative personal view is 
then seen as evidence of individual ineffectiveness, leading to increased pessimism 
(Craske 2003).  Increasingly popular psychological treatments fit with this idea, 
including techniques such as cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) which aim to 
address the problem of anxiety through altering this maladaptive thinking process 
within the individual so that they are again able to operate within society. Freud also 
wrote much about anxiety, with his views on what he termed ‘anxiety neurosis’ 
changing over his lifetime, from a problem of transformed libido to a reaction to 
trauma (Freud 1993 [1925]). These ideas, and the treatment of anxiety through 
psychoanalysis, have influenced psychiatric understanding of anxiety, although 
pharmacological interventions are also offered for anxiety disorders and reflect 
biomedical ideas of anxiety as having an underlying biological cause (Trimble 1996; 
Rees, Lipsedge and Ball 1997). Psychological, biological and psychoanalytic ideas 
mix within psychiatry but all such approaches focus on anxiety within the clinically 
‘ill’ individual rather wider contributing causes, as the result of individual deficit. 
This is in stark contrast to socio-cultural approaches which focus on anxiety as 
problematic in wider society rather than located solely within the individual.  
Socio-cultural approaches to the problem of anxiety remind us that anxiety 
and fear are socially constructed and culturally conditioned responses, aspects to 
anxiety that are less visible in medical conceptualizations.  What we fear and the 
strength of that fear depends on conceptions of the world, the perilous forces that 
reside within it and our options for protection against these (Svendsen 2008:24). 
While cross-cultural approaches to emotion vary (Milton and Svašek 2005) few 
anthropologists would contest that our cultural perspective constructs what we view 
as fearful or anxiety-promoting and that this same cultural view may then promote the 
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extent to which we fear and express this fear and anxiety. The cultural and social 
impact on fear is also suggested by the temporal quality of many fears. Both Svendsen 
and the historian Joanna Bourke suggest that all time periods have their fears but that 
what is feared changes over time (Svendsen 2008; Bourke 2005). This is clearly 
visible in the films and literature of science fiction within the UK over changing time 
periods; Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein was created at the time of, and arguably 
reflected the fears of, the industrial revolution for example, while a proliferation of 
books about nuclear war emerged during the period of the Cold War (Susan Sontag’s 
essay ‘The Imagination of Disaster’ (1965) also deals with changing fears expressed 
in Japanese and American science fiction films). Within Western culture today, what 
Svendsen terms a ‘low intensity fear’ (2008:46) or ‘constant weak “grumbling”’ 
(2008:76) exists as the dominant form of fear and provides a background to our 
experience and the way in which we interpret the world. Consequently this 
‘grumbling’ can be seen as more of a mood than an emotion (Svendsen 2008:46), and 
this culture of fear is emblematic of our period in time and a metaphor through which 
we view our experiences (Furedi 2007). In line with Furedi, Svendsen contends that 
Euro-American cultures consider nearly all phenomena from a perspective of fear 
despite living in a more secure position than we ever have before in history (2008:7). 
Although intimately related, anxiety can be conceptually separated from fear 
in relation to personal experience. Both Bourke (2005) and Svendsen (2008) suggest 
that fear refers to an immediate, ‘objective’ threat. Anxiety, however, is an anticipated 
‘subjective’ threat; anxiety comes from within and is more generalized (Bourke 
2005), lacking a specific object with a nature of ‘indefiniteness’ (Svendsen 2008:35)- 
the ‘constant weak grumbling’ Svendsen mentions above rather than a direct threat. 
Anxiety is therefore ‘deep’, whereas fear is ‘shallow’ (Svendsen 2008:9). 
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Furthermore, in fear, individuals are able to assess the situation and neutralize or flee 
the problem, however those subjectively experiencing anxiety are unable to act 
(Bourke, 2005). For the sociologist Iain Wilkinson, anxiety leaves individuals 
searching for cultural forms which adequately express the true origins and identity of 
the anxiety (Wilkinson 2001). Wilkinson proposes that where individuals remain 
entwined by anxiety therefore, culture has not provided a means by which the feeling 
of being overwhelmed by the uncertainty of the future can be dealt with (Wilkinson, 
2001:131). Wilkinson and Furedi thus link the growth of anxiety and fear to 
modernity and the growth of the risk society within Euro-American culture.  
As well as what might create anxiety changing over time and being connected 
to cultural and social circumstances, how anxiety is expressed may also differ cross-
culturally. Responses to distress differ across cultures and the expression of anxiety 
that has been medicalized by biomedicine might be seen as a particularly Euro-
American presentation. Research on the many examples of what were formally 
termed ‘culture-bound syndromes’ demonstrates different expressions of distress 
located particularly within different societies. This term has largely been dropped due 
to its suggestion of a restrictive, fixed and bounded nature of such expressions and 
research has come to view these presentations as culturally specific collections of 
symptoms and culturally constituted means of displaying distress, or ‘idioms of 
distress’ (Nichter 1981). Littlewood further suggests these might be seen as ‘stylized 
expressive traditional behaviours’ which have moderately similar presentation, can be 
time-limited and while going against everyday ‘normal’ behaviour are condoned 
within the culture as an expression of distress (2002). Such idioms may not 
necessarily be pathologized by these cultures however. Work on ‘ataque de nervious’, 
a cultural expression of distress found in Puerto Rico (and in Spanish-Caribbean 
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individuals elsewhere) describes ataque as ‘an experience accessible to certain 
groups when bad things happen’ which is understood to result from a cultural context 
in which a gender-based expectation of social control exists (Lewis-Fernández, 
Guarnaccia, Martìnez, Salmán, Schmidt and Liebowitz 2009). Ataque can be seen an 
expression of distress best understood within its cultural context. Such a response can 
be compared to the ‘laments’ described by Wilce in Bangladesh where individuals 
express their distress through wept singing, a very different form of expressing 
distress but one in which Wilce argues individual identities can be constructed and 
resistance to power expressed (Wilce 1998). Both laments and ataque are culturally 
condoned forms that may be used to express the anxieties encountered in life. 
Although there is not space here for a full discussion of the ‘symptoms’ of Euro-
American anxiety, placing anxiety in Euro-American cultures in the context of high 
modernity, where the self is viewed in an alternative cosmological way to the past, 
anxiety symptoms perhaps express physically these Euro-American notions of self 
and disconnectedness as well as other Euro-American cultural notions of the body 
itself.  
The dominance of Euro-American medicine and of medical categories has 
made cultural differences peculiar to these cultures easy to miss. Given that the 
majority of these categories were first described in Euro-American cultures based on 
their own populations, Euro-American idioms of distress have been incorporated into 
such definitions, and held up as a standard form, from which other cultural 
expressions deviate in exotic fashions. Placing the medical categories of psychiatry in 
their cultural and historical context highlights the Euro-American cultural specificity 
of these labels however, not only of the ‘pathologies of the West’ such as anorexia 
nervosa and multiple personality disorder described by Littlewood (2002), but also 
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more common mental health problems such as depression (Kleinman and Good 1985; 
Skultans 1979; Showalter 1987). The symptoms of Euro-American anxiety can be 
seen as culturally sanctioned responses, idioms of distress that ‘make sense’ 
culturally- they are a cultural response both in the sense that they respond to socio-
cultural circumstances and in the cultural patterning of how that anxiety is expressed. 
For Euro-American cultures to therefore medicalize anxiety, to construct a diagnosis 
and label these experiences as in need of medical treatment, is a further cultural 
response to these cultural responses, indicative of the status of biomedicine and how 
experiences become incorporated into the medical sphere. Euro-American culture has 
dealt with this increased anxiety through medicalization and it is the medicalization of 
anxiety that I now move on to discuss. 
 
 
The Medicalization of Anxiety 
 
Littlewood suggests that in Western countries, in general distress is medicalized: it is 
‘seen through a lens which encourages us to experience and indeed shape, individual 
concerns in medical ways’, the illness comes from outside, with a cause, pattern and 
perhaps a cure (2002:1). Anxiety also fits this notion; the symptoms of anxiety are 
culturally recognized as a ‘medical’ problem with individuals seeking assistance from 
primary care general practitioners (family doctors) rather that the priests who would 
have been more commonly consulted for anxiety in previous times (Bourke 2005).   
The interconnection between healing and religion are evident in many cultures 
and were once more explicitly linked within Euro-American societies. Religious 
orders previously took a central role in caring for the sick however modernity 
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promoted a split between the religious and medical domains, improvements in science 
developing the medical understanding of the human body and its treatment, and 
power moving from the unproven and unquestioning belief of religion (already 
unsettled through the Reformation), to the demonstrable evidence and rational 
thinking of science during the Enlightenment.  In addition to the movement away 
from religious personnel to medical personnel in care and treatment from the sick, 
wider concerns that refer to suffering and salvation, previously the domain of the 
church- concerns that Good terms ‘soteriological issues’ (1994)- also moved to the 
domain of medicine. Good argues that moral and soteriological issues are ‘fused’ with 
medical issues and that medicine mediates the ‘physiological’ and the ‘soteriological’, 
illness having both physical and existential dimensions as it reveals the infirmity of 
the body and human suffering. For Good, cultures are organized around a 
soteriological view through which the nature of suffering is understood and salvation 
is achieved. In Euro-American cultures, medicine is ‘the core of our soteriological 
vision’ (Good 1994:70), perhaps also reflecting the reduced power and influence of 
the church in Western culture.  Additionally however, as argued above, these 
‘soteriological issues’, how we suffer, live, die, make sense of life are the very stuff of 
Euro-American anxiety, perhaps making anxiety particularly susceptible to being 
placed under the frame of medicine. 
Latour and Woolgar tell us that scientific ‘facts’ are socially constructed 
(1979), but furthermore, such facts and medical labels are also culturally produced. 
Previous anthropological work by authors such as Young (1995) and Littlewood 
(2002) have considered the medicalization of experience into illness, illness 
categories in Euro-American culture and the effects and consequences for those 
involved. Through such work, experience is seen to be translated into ‘symptoms’ and 
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behaviour into ‘pathology’, the ‘abnormal’ sectioned off from everyday experience 
into the pathological realm. Books such as Young’s work on PTSD have illustrated 
how medical labels may be brought about for particular social or political purposes, 
such as the construction of the category of railway spine for insurance claimants 
(Young 1995) as well as the use of and creation of medical labels by drug companies 
to develop new pharmaceutical markets (Lakoff 2008; Watters 2011). Such labels can 
also legitimize behaviour and create or reduce positions of power, and Bourke claims 
that fear itself sorts individuals into hierarchical social positions. She gives the 
example of ‘school-phobia’ being used for middle-class children (working class 
children given the label of ‘truancy’) and states that fear, but we may also add 
medical labels around fear and anxiety, can be related to the distribution of power 
(Bourke 2005). The power exerted by medicine, both through the power of 
medicalization and by the moralizing aspect of medicine is further illustrated in 
Showalter's consideration of ‘hysteria’ in the British context. She suggests that 
medicine took a moralistic role in controlling female sexuality and actions; 
suffragettes and ‘modern’ women desiring to work or divorce their husbands having 
previously been among those diagnosed with ‘hysteria’, rendering them as ‘mad’ and 
in need of (medical) control. Medical management is therefore a way of containing 
women's suffering without confronting its causes (Showalter 1987) and Furedi notes 
the re-orientation of social problems into individual emotional problems in 
contemporary ‘therapy culture’ (2004). The great advantage of this relocation is, of 
course, that it is the problem within the individual that becomes the focus of treatment 
and wider social issues do not need to be addressed, and this may be even more the 
case for a society such as the UK where there has been a strong drive toward an 
individual responsibility for health. Moralizing aspects of medicine can also be found 
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in recent debates around individual responsibility for health and obesity, smoking and 
the promotion of ‘health behaviours’ to support a ‘healthy lifestyle’. These 
prescriptions on how to live again may be seen to be reminiscent of the moralizing 
discourses and position of moral guides previously held by the Christian church in 
earlier history. In adding to other discussions on medicalization which focus on the 
medical system and its positioning and power to medicalize, in this chapter I take a 
slightly different perspective on the medicalization of anxiety. I situate anxiety in its 
cultural and historical context and consider how changes to concepts of self and the 
role of the church impacted on both experiences of anxiety and the development of 
medicine. This is therefore a discussion of medicalization that focuses on the 
cosmological and how cosmological concerns have become viewed as part of the 
realm of medicine. 
 
 
Cosmological Approaches to Anxiety 
 
Rather than focusing specifically on arguments around medicine therefore, I turn my 
attention to understandings of Euro-American (and in particular, British) cultural 
changes over time and how cosmological understandings of the world, the individual 
within it and perceptions of risk and control, might have led not only to increased 
anxiety but also to its medicalization. Sociological and broader social theory 
approaches to anxiety view levels of anxiety found in [Euro-American] society as 
largely resulting from the current period of late/high modernity (Wilkinson 2001; 
Giddens 1991) and it is this relationship that I want to go on to examine in more 
depth.  
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The relationship of modernity to notions of risk is seen as fundamental to this 
largely sociological approach and both Anthony Giddens (1991) and Ulrich Beck 
(1992) have considered risk itself as central to late modernity, ‘fundamental to the 
way both actors and technical specialists organize the social world’ (Giddens 
1991:3). This suggests that modernity produces a ‘risk society’ or ‘risk culture’, 
where public knowledge and debates about risk and the riskiness of everyday life as 
well as the introduction of new types of risk previous generations have not faced 
(such as nuclear war and environmental breakdown) are present in the everyday life 
of the individual. Despite the actual overall reduction in life-threatening events for the 
individual (Lupton 1999), this greater knowledge of risk, Giddens and Beck argue, 
increase our insecurity about our individual position in society, our ability to live in 
safety and make us more anxious about the future ahead of us.  
In addition to greater awareness of perceived risk and the related insecurity 
this brings, risk society is also about not only what has happened, but what could 
happen, and where no one is out of danger (Svendsen 2008:48-50). In fact, Pat Caplan 
argues that whereas previously the past was used to determine the present, the future, 
as this is seen through various risk scenarios, is now used to determine the present, 
history being of little significance (Caplan 2000).  Such a focus on risk and future risk 
is also, by its very nature, related to uncertainty and attempts to control. Svendsen 
suggests that uncertainty is a basic element of human life and argues that [Euro-
American culture] is dominated by the ‘precautionary principle’ as a response to 
dealing with such uncertainty (2008:67). Such a principle constructs a world where 
the future is made up of dangers rather than possibilities (Svendsen 2008:71). 
Svendsen cites the British Medical Journal’s decision to forbid the use of the word 
‘accident’ it its pages as symptomatic of the view that the world is completely 
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controllable (2008:64). Here it is also perhaps worth noting that this article occurs in a 
medical journal; not only the world is viewed as controllable but medicine in 
particular is portrayed as fully understanding the world. Science now guides that 
individual rather than religion (Furedi 2007; Svendsen 2008, Bourke 2005) and 
authors such as Giddens (1991) argue that the process of modernity decreased the role 
of the church and promoted a scientific and rational worldview. But as the historian 
Bourke notes, science has dispelled superstitions but has also delivered new fears and 
new risks (Bourke 2005) including risks beyond individual human control such as 
those related to the environmental and the political sphere. 
How dangers are conceptualized and dealt with has changed through 
modernity, not only through notions of risk but also through increased 
individualization. Individualism was also seen to rise at the same time as the growth 
of risk (within modernity) and with it, what Caplan calls an ‘ongoing search for 
morality’ (2000:6) where individuals look to control and improve themselves rather 
than the social environment.  In fact, the very position of the individual in relation to 
the world around them has changed through modernity, with the individual located as 
the seat of power rather than external forces. As suggested by Lupton, individuals in 
Euro-American cultures feel they maintain a high level of control over danger and 
exposure to danger, risk is therefore viewed as the responsibility of humans rather 
than notions of fate or destiny (Lupton 1999), and therefore the church has no role in 
contributing to this. Individuals thus bear greater responsibility but, stripped of the 
support and guidance previously afforded by the church, are also more vulnerable and 
alone to deal with the risks they are increasingly aware of. Risks are not only practical 
and related to the social environment but also relate to the security of the individual, 
producing existential anxiety.  
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Taking these understandings of risk society and modernity further therefore, 
anxiety can also be interpreted as existential angst, a situation where individuals 
struggle to create meaning in their lives from the uncertain world that surrounds them 
(May 1996). This idea has also been considered by Anthony Giddens who links 
anxiety and the notion of ‘ontological insecurity’ in relation to the process of 
modernity. The concept of ontological insecurity was developed previously by R.D. 
Laing who saw the ontologically secure person as one who is able to meet life’s 
problems ‘from a centrally firm sense of his own and other people’s reality and 
identity’ (1990 [1960]:39). Ontological security gives the individual the experience of 
self and the relation of the self to the world around the individual, a world that the 
individual organizes through what Giddens terms ‘basic trust’ (1991:38). This trust, 
developed through the individual’s upbringing and socialization, is connected to the 
individual’s identity and is the ‘protective cocoon’ that individuals carry with them to 
allow them to continue with the activities of everyday life (1991:40). It is argued 
therefore that the process of modernity contributes to feelings of ontological 
insecurity, which in turn brings about feelings of anxiety. This anxiety also creates 
further feelings of insecurity by impeding the awareness of a sense of self as it 
challenges the confidence of the relationship between self and outside world (Giddens 
1991).  
The precursor and an explanation for the historical development of 
‘ontological insecurity’ in Western culture can be related to the argument of Eric 
Fromm in his work Escape from Freedomi. Fromm takes an existential psychological 
position that argues that all humans have a need to feel related or connected to the 
outside world; humans have a need to avoid isolation and that therefore individual 
freedom from the bounds tying the individual to the world are important. Religion and 
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other belief systems give protection from ‘aloneness’ and security, without which life 
lacks meaning (Fromm 1994). For Fromm, individuals in Euro-American cultures 
have become ‘more free’ (including existentially free), but without the religious hold 
that previously gave security. This process started with the breakdown of the feudal 
society of medieval society which gave individual freedom from previous economic 
and political ties but also freedom from the ties which gave a feeling of belonging and 
of security. Before this breakdown, Fromm argues, there was no notion of the 
individual ‘self’, people were part of a family, a village, the construction of the 
universe was simple and the relationship with God based on confidence and love. 
Afterwards, the individual was free but anxious and alone, seeing others as potential 
competitors, existentially threatened and with a view of God that was also less secure. 
Luther’s theology gave expression to this experience and offered a solution; moving 
away from church authority to an individual relationship with God but in so doing, the 
individual needed to accept their own insignificance and powerlessness, and leave 
behind the notion that humans had salvation and instead view life as being about 
being productive economically. Protestantism therefore helped the individual deal 
with their anxiety, re-orientating the individual to this novel world and developing an 
individualistic worldview as ties from others were lost and the individual faced God 
on their own. Unlike Weber’s otherwise similar view of Protestantism, Weber saw 
time as developing a novel cultural spirit and economic behaviour (Weber 1992 
[1930]) while Fromm suggests that society moulded a particular social character 
within the individual which formed the basis of new cultural ideas (Fromm 1994).  
For Fromm then, the individual self and its connection to society became 
uncertain and thrown into doubt through historic changes in the medieval period, but 
the anxiety this generated was coped with through religious attachment and the drive 
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to work. Such ideas are a useful grounding for theories of modernity that have 
considered the changing role of the church after this period, the increased secularism 
and individualism pursued through the process of modernity and the increased 
vulnerability of the individual self. For example Wilkinson suggests that anxiety may 
be a modern term for an age-old feeling, part of the very nature and psychology of 
being human (2001:45). In such a secular culture he suggests, psychological language 
has replaced religious language in the way we explain our experiences;  
 
When it comes to discussing matters of feeling, we now prefer to speak 
with deference to the authority of experts in the fields of human 
science rather than the (more doubtful) wisdom of those who would 
explain our problem in terms of our relationship toward God. However 
in taking up the language of anxiety, perhaps we have not only come to 
explain ourselves differently, but further, we may also have begun to 
modify the way we feel (Wilkinson 2001:45).  
 
Anxiety can thus be linked to cultural experiences of modernity not 
only through the process of modernity resulting in greater awareness of risk, 
individualization and ontologically insecurity, but also through increased 
secularization. The diminishing role of the church as well as cultural changes 
which altered understandings of self, others and the divine meant that those 
experiences of everyday life which were formally the domain of churches 
became increasingly the realm of medicine and psychology. These changes 
suggest cosmological shifts in how the world was understood to operate; 
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cosmological issues moving from being questions for churches to deal with to 
questions for medicine and psychology. 
 
 
The Psychologization of Self and Ontological Insecurity 
 
Problems of the self are not only discussed in psychological language in Euro-
American cultures, but are also psychologized; Fabrega for example suggests that 
mental illnesses themselves are ‘disturbances of the self’ (Fabrega 1992:100). The 
self, placed within the individual body through individualism, is thus expressed 
through the body and it is interesting to note that one of the ‘symptoms’ of anxiety, 
and a number of other mental illnesses, is a feeling of ‘depersonalization’; the 
individual feels detached from the self and an outside observer of what they are doing 
and thinking (American Psychiatric Association 2000). The relationship between 
anxiety and a sense of self can also be seen in the historical use of lobotomies to treat 
anxiety and fear; Bourke notes that these procedures were successful as they 
destroyed a sense of self (2005). Changes over time in the view of the self and the 
move from religious assistance to psychological help has also been noted by Bourke 
in her historical review; whereas in the past the anxious individual might have turned 
to the church for comfort, as the self was then located within the body through the 
twentieth century, anxiety was more individualized and treated through therapy or 
self-help (2005). For Furedi, this therapy has become a strong influence in Euro-
American culture, a ‘cultural phenomenon rather than a clinical technique’ (2004:22) 
which demonstrates Euro-American culture’s new focus on the importance of 
emotion and how this domain is dealt with (2004).  
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Furedi argues that within Euro-American ‘therapy culture’, therapy is linked 
to identity, a ‘therapeutic script’ used to understand the self. Furthermore, therapy 
culture itself has cultivated emotional vulnerability through the endorsement of a 
position where the self is seen as limited and fragile, in need of ongoing therapeutic 
intervention, without emotional resources to cope with adverse circumstances; a 
vulnerable self (2004). Interestingly, Furedi also points out that theologians are now 
‘therapists’ (2004) as the growing literature and development of the field of pastoral 
psychology are testament to. This also represents an opportunity for religious figures 
to re-engage with individuals suffering from anxiety, albeit using techniques and 
approaches developed from more clinical interventions which therefore keep anxiety 
within a medicalized framework.  
As Fromm notes, historical social changes within Western culture have placed 
the site of control within the individual self. This is reinforced by the scientific 
worldview, for example through the psychological notion of the ‘locus of control’ii, 
the level to which the individual feels personal control of their actions and the world 
around them. Having a high internal locus of control is viewed as more positive than 
having a high external locus of control, with the latter previously been seen as more 
prevalent in poorer populations and thus an explanation for poorer health in these 
areas (Poortinga, Dunstan and Fone 2007). This individual locus of control situated in 
the self is related by Littlewood to experiences such as anxiety. He suggests that 
anxiety, as well as other expressions and emotions, communicate a representation of 
the self that has lost self will and control, a loss that can be short-term or permanent, 
partial or complete (2002:185). The content of such experiences, the framework, 
expectations and responses around these, organize individual narratives which also 
illustrate what Littlewood terms ‘the experiential reality of our local cosmology’ 
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(2002:186). Through the process of modernity therefore, there has been a 
psychologization of self and the site of control has been situated within the individual; 
the self is discussed in psychological language, disturbances of the self have been 
pathologized and self-control has become to be seen as a psychological trait.  
Research within medicine and psychology have also examined, and found a 
place for, ontological security (including through religious faith) in alleviating 
anxiety, research which also demonstrates how these concepts have themselves 
become part of psychology. Antonovsky’s (1979, 1987) notion of our ‘sense of 
coherence’ (SOC), the way in which human beings make sense of the world and use 
the required resources to respond to it can be viewed as strikingly similar to the 
notions of ontological security and cosmological understandings. Studies that have 
investigated SOC have found a negative correlation with anxiety and depression and a 
positive correlation with optimism and self-esteem (Hart, Hittner and Paras 1991). 
Some psychiatrists and psychologists recognize that spirituality and religiosity 
emphasize the depth of meaning and purpose in life and that religion is a coping 
strategy for dealing with life events (Dein, Cook, Powell and Eagger 2010) and note 
that many religions also hold a ‘just world hypothesis’ (Hogg, Adelman and Blagg 
2010); good things happen to good people, bad things happen to bad people and in 
this way, the world has method, consistency and purpose. Furthermore a 2009 study 
found that when conducting tasks measuring uncertainty, participants with greater 
religiosity and a stronger belief in God had a reduced reaction in the cortical system 
involved in self-regulation of anxiety. The authors concluded that religious conviction 
[and the ontological security it is connected to], act as a buffer against anxiety and 
provide a framework for action and understanding of the environment (Inzlicht, 
McGregor, Hirsh and Nash 2009). Anxiety and ontological insecurity have therefore 
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also become part of medical and psychological studies, but as these studies 
demonstrate, so has religious faith itself. Attempts to understand religious faith from 
within medicine have focused on psychological benefits, such as security and support, 
which emerge from religious faith; an approach which then rationalizes the religious 
within a scientific worldview. Rather than being thought of as ‘ignorance’ of 
scientific ‘knowledge’iii, religiosity and religious experiences are, from this 
perspective, thought of as fulfilling a psychological need (or symptomatic of 
psychiatric disorder) and resulting in the religious domain remaining subordinate to 
the medical field.  
Within the medical field, psychiatry itself has been seen as lower status and 
less ‘medical’ than other specialties, psychiatry and mental health services typically 
receiving less funding and focus than other areas.  Psychiatry has been viewed, and is 
still viewed by those within medicine and outside, as less scientific that other medical 
disciplines. Dealing as it does with illnesses that are often less obviously attributed to 
a solely biological base and without biological tests (both of great importance within a 
medical worldview), the psychiatrist works more prominently in an uncertain world- 
another strike against it from the certainty-loving scientists. The need to make 
psychiatry more allied to science and thus more ‘medical’ and therefore more distant 
from religion, may mean that psychiatrists in particular psychologize cosmological 
understandings of anxiety, ontological insecurity and religion more broadly, focusing 
on the need for a medical ‘cure’. This also relates to research findings where a 
substantial difference exists between the religiosity of the American population and 
American psychiatrists (psychiatrists being far less religious) (Lukoff, Lu and Turner 
1992) but also why psychiatrists have been found to be less likely to be religious in 
general that other medical disciplines (Curlin, Odell, Lawrence, Chin, Lantos, Meador 
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and Koenig 2007). These findings link to ongoing debates about the role of religion in 
psychiatry and the ‘religiosity gap’ between psychiatrists (and other mental health 
clinicians) and mental health patients (Dein, Cook, Powell and Eagger 2010; Lukoff, 
Lu and Turner 1992). In Curlin, Odell, Lawrence et al’s study, religious physicians 
were also found to be less willing than nonreligious physicians to refer patients to 
psychiatrists (Curlin, Odell, Lawrence et al 2007). Lukoff, Lu and Turner note the 
historical tensions between religion and psychiatry which they attribute to the close 
links between psychiatry and psychoanalysis and therefore to Freud’s anti-religious 
stance (Lukoff, Lu and Turner 1992). The ability to ‘explain away’ religion as a 
coping method by psychology and psychiatry may also be added as a possible 
contributor, as demonstrated in Hogg, Adelman and Blagg’s notion of the 
‘Uncertainty-Identity Theory’ to ‘account’ for religiousnessiv.  
Religiosity and cosmological ideas have over time therefore become part of 
psychology, transformed into testable and quantifiable concepts to be measured 
scientifically. As noted above, science has given Euro-American cultures a worldview 
based on certainty, a cosmology founded on rationality. This view also privileges the 
power of ‘evidence’. Through a scientific worldview, a God cannot exist as there is 
no [scientific] ‘evidence’, as Dawkins’ book, The God Delusion, tells us (Dawkins 
2006). Evidence replaces and de-values experience, taking it out of the personal realm 
to be treated as a separate, and often measurable, ‘thing’ of its own, a disease with the 
possibility of ‘cure’. Anxiety therefore can move from being an experience to being a 
diagnosis. Its changing nature and cultural embeddedness is stripped away through 
this process as its components and its diagnostic label should be discrete and 
objective, able to be applied to any body in any place at any time so that treatment can 
be instigated. The foggy and unstable boundaries of anxiety have, however, caused 
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problems for the classification of anxiety and in this last section, I focus on some of 
the ways medicine has tried to deal with anxiety within medicine.  
 
 
Medicine Deals with Anxiety 
 
Once biomedicine had staked a claim to anxiety, it then had to find a place for it 
within wider medical categories. The scientific approach of defining illness 
categories, creating order from disorder, is particularly difficult in the case of anxiety. 
Like many other mental illnesses, definitive medical ‘tests’ are unavailable to 
ascertain the presence or not of the disorder and, as previously noted, the key areas 
about which individuals worry change over time and can depend on the individual as 
well as social circumstances e.g. economic recession bringing fears related to finance 
and financial stress (Mental Health Foundation 2009).  How these are interpreted in a 
scientific framework, in which Latour and Woolgar suggest ‘social’ factors ‘disappear 
once a fact is established’ (1979:23), is challenging and may contribute to the 
changing descriptions of medical anxiety over the years.  
To try to deal with some of the range of presentation and concerns within the 
broad category of anxiety, biomedicine has created sub-categories within the broader 
classification of “anxiety”, different symptoms indicating different subgroups of the 
disease and suggesting different treatment plans. However, separating these different 
groups, and distinguishing anxiety from other conditions such as depression has not 
been straightforward. The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) guidelines produced for clinical practitioners in the UK notes the difficulty in 
distinguishing the anxiety disorder ‘sub-types’ from each other, and indeed some 
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differences in categorization exist between the categories given by NICE, the 
contemporary version of the World Health Organization’s International Classification 
of Disorders (ICD-10) and the contemporary version of the American Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) (National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence 2004; World Health Organization 1992; American Psychiatric 
Association 2013)  These differences relate largely to the emphasis placed on 
different symptoms and the number of symptoms needed to be present to make a 
diagnosis (Gale and Davidson 2007), and illustrate that this category is not immutable 
even by medical standards.  
Before 1980, those with severe feelings of anxiety would have been diagnosed 
with ‘anxiety neurosis’ (Barlow and Wincze 1998), a condition first described by 
Freud in 1895 (Freud 1993 [1925]). This connection to Freud and his method of 
psychoanalysis remained linked to the condition of anxiety until the publication of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third Edition (DSM-III) 
which introduced the separation of anxiety disorders under the wider category of 
anxiety. This also brought anxiety more firmly into the realm of medicine, and 
clinical care of anxiety was initiated by research which suggested a more medical 
basis to one of the anxiety disorders. The anthropologist Byron Good, who advised on 
the development of the DSM III, notes the excitement around the category of panic 
disorder at this time (Good 2002) as recently published articles had found that patients 
with panic disorder responded to anti-depressants, unlike patients with generalized 
anxiety disorder (GAD), and that panic attacks could appear ‘unprovoked…out of the 
blue’. These factors suggested a biological basis for what had previously been viewed 
as a ‘psychological disturbance and the strong hold of psychoanalysis’ (Good 2002). 
Jackie Orr suggests in her book on the history (and personal experience) of panic 
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disorder that the new DSM was based on empirical and observable symptoms, 
categorizations and diagnoses based on tests and techniques which ‘became central to 
psychiatric thinking’. Through these changes, psychiatric researchers then overtook 
clinicians as the ‘most powerful force in the profession’ in comparison, claims from 
psychoanalysis were viewed to be un-provable and less relevant (Orr 2006:225). The 
historical (and cultural) situatedness of the DSM and the diagnostic categories it puts 
forward is further illustrated through the discussion of proposed amendments to the 
category of GAD in the fifth version of the DSM (DSM-5) (Lewis-Fernàndez, 
personal communication 2010). Again such changes illustrate the difficulties in 
placing anxiety in a rigid medical framework.  
Biomedical categories are of course created through research and over time 
and are not ‘naturally’ occurring. Latour and Woolgar remind us that scientists 
attempt to produce order, struggling to impose a framework that reduces ‘background 
noise’ giving an apparently logical and coherent outcome (1979:36-7). Uncertainty is 
not welcomed by science or by Western medicine (as the banning of the word 
‘accident’ in the British Medical Journal is testament to (Davis and Pless 2001) and 
part of the scientist’s role is to create the order our worldview requires, ‘order is the 
rule...disorder should be eliminated wherever possible’ (Latour and Woolgar 
1979:251). Through setting up categories, uncertainty can be lessoned as the world is 
set in order, as convincingly argued by Douglas (2002 [1966]). This creation of order 
from disorder arguably was also previously the realm of formal religion and the 
church in separating the sacred from the secular and promoting a divine ordering 
through which the individual understands personal experience. The very basis of 
anxiety is uncertainty and disorder however, and therefore it is not surprising that 
historical changes to the dominant framework through which the world is ordered by 
 25 
society has resulted in changes to the social institution that deals with the problem of 
anxiety. Both of these institutions, the church and medicine, have wielded great power 
at different time periods to interpret individual experience (not least the experience of 
anxiety) in their own terms. With the reduced positing of the church, the growth of 
medicine and the fields of psychiatry and psychology and changes to understandings 
of the cosmological, anxiety might be seen as particularly ripe for medicalization.  
On these bases, how might the data on increased anxiety at the start of this 
chapter be understood? Are we actually becoming more anxious or might rates of 
clinical anxiety merely point to increased diagnosis of anxiety? More frequent 
diagnosis might also be attributed to changes in expressions of anxiety, clinical 
definitions, wider attitudes towards mental illness, knowledge of clinicians and even 
the actions of drug companies looking to act on new markets. Furthermore, can we 
assume that all existential angst has been medicalized, or that that the psychological 
and medical realm has full dominance over cosmological understandings? For many 
patients for example, medicine and the scientific perspective do not explain 
everything. Medicine may explain why two individuals had a heart attack, but cannot 
always explain why one died and other didn’t, it may explain the ‘how’ of a situation, 
but not necessarily the why. These understandings can be linked to umbaga, the 
‘second spear’ found in Evans Pritchard’s study of the Azande (1976 [1937]); while, 
in his famous example, it was understood that the granary fell because it was being 
eaten by termites, umbaga provides the explanation as to why it fell on those people 
at that particular time. These understandings can be found too in UK ethnographic 
work on ‘lay’ perspectives of illness, for example in Davison, Frankel and Davey 
Smith’s study on explanations for illness in a Welsh village (Davison, Frankel and 
Davey Smith 1992). Here, health promotion messages were counteracted by stories of 
 26 
‘Uncle Norman’ who had smoked and drunk all his life only to die in his late 90s 
(while another individual who had been healthy all their life had died suddenly, at a 
young age). Notions of ‘luck’ and ‘fate’ were used to complement more medical 
perspectives, explanations that have not been completely removed through the 
increasing power of scientism. These notions of ‘luck’ and ‘fate’ attribute cause to an 
external agency, perhaps not surprising given the tradition of viewing a God as ‘up 
there’ unlike traditions elsewhere such as the Yolmo, where cosmological ideas are 
represented in the individual body and in society as well as in the cosmos (Desjarlais 
1992).  This is not incompatible with ideas of individualism, Heelas (1981, cited in 
Littlewood 2002:184) suggests that in cases of a strong emphasis on the autonomous 
self, deviations from what we wish to occur are attributed to a discrete agency which 
is external to the self. Perhaps therefore, anxiety has become medicalized but is also 
not entirely resolved by medicalization; people’s cosmological worlds are not entirely 
taken over by a medicalizing force and nor are they entirely passive agents to 
biomedicine’s increasing dominance.  
Through taking a cosmological perspective of anxiety, the reasons for the 
medicalization are perhaps therefore not surprising given the increased role of science 
and medicine over the previously dominant religious structure that has resulted 
through the process of Euro-American modernity. Euro-American culture and the 
process of modernity may contribute not only to increasing anxiety therefore, but are 
also involved in creating a particular type of Euro-American anxiety linked with 
Euro-American notions of the self and the cosmological position of the self in relation 
to the world around it. Culturally, again in response to changes stimulated by the 
process of modernity in these societies, anxiety is handed to clinicians as part of the 
domain of medicine. This is not to say, of course, that other cultures do not 
 27 
experience anxiety as certainly they do, but that there is something particularly Euro-
American about the pattern of distress expressed through clinical anxiety and how this 
is then dealt with through medicalization. Through this perspective, anxiety emerges 
as a cultural response; profoundly affected by culturally specific actions and reactions 
and linked inexorably to the Western process of modernity in its construction, 
experience and resolution. I have sought to draw out how changing cosmological 
understandings might emerge from wider cultural shifts, and how these in turn might 
result in changing cultural responses. This is not just a discussion about anxiety and 
medicalization therefore, but seeks to contribute another means by which examination 
of the cosmological might reveal something about mental illness.   
 
Notes 
 
                                                        
i Escape from Fear was published with the title ‘Fear of Freedom’ within the UK in 
1941. 
 
ii The psychological notion of ‘locus of control’ was developed from Rotter’s 1954 
concept of social learning theory which suggests that expectations about the future are 
developed from previous experience (cited in Poortinga, Dunstan and Fone 2007). 
 
iii Good (1994) makes the point that lay health understandings have typically been 
termed ‘beliefs’ and contrasted with scientific ‘knowledge’ to emphasize the validity 
of scientific vs. non-scientific understandings of the world. 
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iv Hogg, Adelman and Blagg’s ‘Uncertainty-Identity Theory’ suggests that religions 
have attributes that make them well suited to reduce feeling of self-uncertainty as 
individuals are able to lessen feelings of self-uncertainty through identification with 
groups.  While all groups provide belief systems and normative prescriptions, they 
argue, religions also address the nature of existence and provide a moral compass, 
making religious affiliation of particular attractiveness in uncertain times (Hogg, 
Adelman and Blagg 2010). Such a theory is similar to Fromm’s argument regarding 
the appeal of religion, both also accepting that self-uncertainty can be related to 
ontological certainty. 
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